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their own. They found distinction by
leading the nation through crises, carefully shaping the direction of national
security policy and recasting the
boundaries of presidential authority.
Through careful historical analysis, Yoo
reminds us that the relationship between presidential greatness and the
exercise of executive power is an
inextricable link that has always taken
advantage of the vague contours of Article II of the Constitution, which addresses executive authority. In his
historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces
the founders’ work at the Constitutional Convention to accommodate the
executive’s energy and decisiveness
within a workable constitutional
framework.
In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and
addressing the Indian uprisings of
1789–90, the first U.S. president believed that Congress having created a
military, he had the authority to decide
when and how to use it. In the latter
case, Washington sought no authority
from Congress when he directed an attack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians
150 miles within their territory. Similarly, in the Prize Cases, President Lincoln concluded, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that after hostile acts are directed against this nation the president
is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any legislative authority.
President Roosevelt went even farther
prior to the Second World War by taking action to assist Britain through the
Lend-Lease program and to isolate Japan from critical resources without
congressional approval or consultation,
actions that clearly provoked Japan and
drew the United States ever closer to
war.
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A later section in the book reflects the
application of this lengthy historical
analysis to the current administration
and to the response of the Bush administration to 9/11. Yoo points out that
President Bush looked to former presidents for support of his actions. He
states succinctly that “Congress simply
does not have the ability to make effective, long-term national security decisions because of the difficulty in
organizing 535 legislators and the political incentives that drive them toward
short-term, risk-averse thinking.”
In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on
President Obama’s early determination
to close the detention facility at
Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s
special authority to question terrorists,
and to suspend military commissions in
the middle of the trials of al-Qa‘ida
leaders for war crimes. Describing the
new president’s law enforcement approach to terrorist violence, he asks
whether this approach, although popular with his liberal supporters, can be
successful. He suggests that the new
president may be learning to “draw on
the mainspring of Presidential power as
deeply as his greatest predecessors.”
COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Chairman, Veterans Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. The Fourth Star:
Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future
of the United States Army. New York: Crown,
2009. 330pp. $28

Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe
have attempted to provide a narrative
of the U.S. Army from the end of the
Vietnam War through the present wars

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:06 AM

1

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

160

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 16

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

in Iraq and Afghanistan by tracing the
careers of four Army general officers.
Using biographic sketches of Generals
John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter
Chiarelli, and David Petraeus, The
Fourth Star seeks to show how the
Army has changed doctrinally and developed its leaders. Cloud and Jaffe deliver a story that is engaging, although
short on analysis, explaining how as an
institution the Army adapted postVietnam. As a result of their approach,
the story of the “epic struggle” for the
Army’s future between fighting counterinsurgencies and conventional battles is anecdotal at best. The scholarly
opinions that have shaped the debate
over the future Army doctrine are
missing.
Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Department of Social Sciences (“Sosh”) at West
Point was instrumental in shaping the
strategic thinking of these Army leaders
as well as of the Army as an institution.
The book attributes the unconventional
thinking of Petraeus and Chiarelli to
their experiences as Sosh instructors.
Cloud and Jaffe explain how Petraeus
collaborated with Andrew Krepinevich
(author of The Army and Vietnam,
1988), to place the blame for the service’s failures in Vietnam directly on the
Army. Throughout the text, the authors
are careful to note Sosh alumni who
serve with or under these generals. Yet
the emphasis on the role of the Sosh faculty in this story is somewhat misleading
—especially since both current and former Sosh faculty are the main sources
for much of the narrative. One could
have easily looked to West Point’s Department of History to find similar connections and influence. The roles of Dr.
Fred Kagan and Brigadier General H. R.
McMaster in shaping the “surge”

strategy of 2007 and 2008 represent an
example.
However, Cloud and Jaffe do succeed in
chronicling four generals whose careers
began at the end of Vietnam and have
culminated in the present. Petraeus is
portrayed as the overly competitive
Francophile infantryman, Abizaid as
the international soldier-student of
Arab culture, Casey as the hard-charging
armor officer, and Chiarelli as the career tanker of Cold War Europe. While
Reagan’s military readied itself for tank
battles with the Soviet Union, these officers were going to graduate school
and thinking seriously about the next
war. In the post–Cold War years, all
four men gained promising reputations
during crises in Kurdish Iraq, Haiti, and
Bosnia.
The chapters on Iraq are the most interesting. Abizaid, as commander of U.S.
Central Command, seems to understand the challenges of a post-Saddam
Iraq but is powerless to stop the rush
toward de-Baathification. Petraeus, for
his part, appears as the imperious commander, acting as a statesman and commander in creating a post-Saddam
government in Mosul. Conversely,
Casey seems overwhelmed, coming to
terms with his errant assumption about
defeating the insurgency through elections and politics by the end of 2006. By
the end of the book, Abizaid and Casey
have become the older, ineffectual
model of the post-Vietnam Army, while
Chiarelli and Petraeus are the newer,
progressive model—the Army that emphasizes protecting the people over protecting the force.
The Fourth Star offers additional understanding to events already described by
fellow journalists Bob Woodward, Tom
Ricks, and Linda Robinson. However,
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the book about this epic struggle for the
future of the Army doctrine is still yet
to be written.
LT. COL. JON SCOTT LOGEL, U.S. ARMY

Naval War College

Miller, Aaron David. The Much Too Promised
Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli
Peace. New York: Bantam, 2008. 407pp. $26

This interesting book aims at unraveling a significant mystery that has lain at
the heart of international diplomacy for
more than a generation: Why and how
has America failed to bring lasting
peace to the Middle East? Specifically,
why, despite so much expended American money and political effort, does
peace between the Jordan River valley
and the Mediterranean look as far off
today as in the last forty years? Answers
to this question have never been lacking, yet few authors have tried to tackle
it comprehensively and fairly.
There are few individuals better placed
to answer this question than Aaron David Miller, a scholar-diplomat who was
an eyewitness to much of the drama he
recounts, having served as an adviser on
the Middle East to six U.S. secretaries of
state. Miller’s prose is accessible and
more, as he draws the reader into behindthe-scenes vignettes that make the most
of a topic that is potentially mindnumbing, given its complexities and
nuances. The author is refreshingly
open about his biases as an American
Jew whose emotions about the plight of
the Palestinians are sincere, as are his
not-infrequent frustrations with the Israelis. His notion that both Israelis and
Palestinians are caught in a macabre
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diplomatic dance that occasionally
delves into comedies of the absurd
would merit a smile, were it not for the
countless lives—and, as Miller demonstrates, diplomatic careers—that have
been wrecked while the band plays on.
Miller’s vivid, usually empathetic descriptions of the cast of characters alone
are worth the price of admission. This is
diplomatic history at its most accessible
and enjoyable. Miller’s lively work is
thoroughly researched, including interviews with almost all the dramatis personae, so this is much more than a
you-are-there account. The author’s
analysis of the problems that he, like so
many others, failed to unravel fully is
candid and detailed, and it will be a reference source for future generations of
scholars.
Moreover, The Much Too Promised
Land deserves high praise for finding
paths through all the major minefields,
not least the vexing issue of the Israeli
lobby, the alleged den of limitless Jewish money and aggressively neocon influence on U.S. foreign and defense
policy. While not all readers will accept
Miller’s answers, the fair-minded will
appreciate the care and tact with which
he addresses them. In this sense, this
work is a polite refutation of such recent academic writings as those of Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen
Walt, who have perhaps indulged in an
overdrawn analysis of Israeli influence
in Washington, D.C.
In his conclusion, Miller offers some
thoughtful guideposts to thinking about
this never-ending problem and what it
means for regional and international
security. Considering that the ArabIsraeli dispute looks as intractable as
ever (and that the Jewish state is facing
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